Blog

A differently formatted blog is forthcoming. In the meantime, here’s an inaugural post:

An Elaboration on External Regulation?

Thoughts and musings on whether the definition of external regulation should necessarily involve the linkage of an amotivated outcome to an introjected, identified, integrated, or intrinsically valued—a motivated—one.

A Motivation Continuum?

One of the more fundamental concepts of Self-Determination Theory is the motivation continuum. A frequently cited figure arranges different regulatory styles in a line, starting with amotivation at the left, impersonal, and moving through external regulation, introjection, identification, integration, and intrinsic motivation as they cycle through controlled forms of motivation into autonomous ones. What I wonder here is whether, rather than a linear conception, it might be useful to consider (or formally redefine) external regulation as a composite. To kick off this discussion, I’ve included some definitions of the relevant constructs

Definitions of External Regulation

A behavior is externally regulated if it is motivated by and dependent on external reward or punishment contingencies… Within OIT, external regulation is defined by the experience or perception that one is doing the behavior because of an external contingency. Therefore, the dependence of the behavior on a contingency is a function of the fact that, when externally regulated, individuals will perform the behavior only when there is an expectancy (implicit or explicit) that the contingency is in effect. Thus there is a behavior dependence on the reward or punishment contingencies: People perform the behavior because they are expecting a separable consequence. (Ryan & Deci, 2017)

Just to the right of amotivation, is a category that represents the least autonomous forms of extrinsic motivation, a category we label external regulation. Such behaviors are performed to satisfy an external demand or obtain an externally imposed reward contingency. (Ryan & Deci, 2000)

The most controlled motivation is external motivation, which is acting solely to obtain a reward or to avoid punishment. (Turban et al., 2007)

External regulation concerns behaviors driven by externally imposed rewards and punishments and is a form of motivation typically experienced as controlled and non-autonomous. (Ryan & Deci, 2020)

Definitions of Amotivation

Amotivation describes a state in which one either is not motivated to behave, or one behaves in a way that is not mediated by intentionality. According to the cognitive tradition (e.g., Heider, 1958 ), people are motivated only to the extent that their actions are intended. But when an individual finds no value, rewards, or meaning in an act, he or she will likely have no intention of performing it; he or she will be amotivated. (Ryan & Deci, 2017)

At the far left [of the motivation continuum] is amotivation, which is the state of lacking an intention to act. When amotivated, a person’s behavior lacks intentionality and a sense of personal causation (Deci & Ryan, 2000)

Amotivation, all too common in classroom settings, can result from either lack of felt competence to perform, or lack of value or interest. (Deci & Ryan, 2020)

The Argument 

External regulation is by definition characterized by the lack of behavior energized by values integrated into the self. But, contrary to amotivation, it’s not characterized by the lack of behavior. Instead, as the above definitions emphasize, in SDT’s view a reward orients and energizes externally regulated behaviors. There seems to be something missing, however, from this definition. Namely, that rewards and punishments derive their influence from the coupling of a non-valued outcome (at least by the target of the contingencies) with an outcome energized by another outcome that is valued. To use plainer language, we might say that one value (external to the self) piggy-backs on another (internal to the self). While this doesn’t seem like a substantial logical jump from current definitions—that external regulation in effect recruits(at least partially) integrated regulation is at some level implied by lay definitions of the term reward—making this additional level of detail explicit seems like it would have a number of benefits. 

First, if a reward or punishment must link to previously integrated values in order to energize and orient behavior, we would expect someone to remain amotivated even in the presence a reward that does not do so. Offering a piece of chocolate to students if they raise their hands in class shouldn’t contribute to motivation for students who dislikechocolate, so all else equal the expected result should be continued amotivation.1 An account of which rewards trigger external regulation must then be anchored in the target’s value system.

Second, while existing SDT discussions acknowledge that most behavior is likely energized by a combination of motivations, such as the student who both enjoys coursework and exhibits ego-involvement, perhaps external regulation is always a composite of two or more qualitatively different motivational states—one of which will be amotivation. In this case, would we expect external regulation to have lesser decrements to wellbeing if the composite includes one or more relatively autonomous forms? One common scenario might be a parent who imposes external regulations around children’s behavior by alternatively promising a desired food or threatening to withhold access to videogames. (“If you behave, we’ll go for ice cream,” or, “If you don’t behave, I’ll take away your XBox.”) Since desired foods, all things being equal, are anchored in intrinsic (physiological) values, we might expect that linkage to result in an overall higher experience of autonomy relative to (at least the subset of) students whose video game usage is tied to ego-involvement and social comparison.

Third, while the outcomes that orient someone to impose a reward and/or punishment scheme may be external to the target of those contingencies, they will have some degree of internalization for someone. I say someone, because establishing contingencies may still not be autonomous for the person imposing them—consider a teacher, for example, who bribes students with candy to participate in class study sessions in preparation for standardized tests and whose compensation or continued employment may be tied to performance.3 Relatedly, I wonder whether the form(s) of motivation that energize and orient contingency selection and imposition impact either the manner in which they are imposed (e.g a single mention vs. repeated reminders), the specific contents of rewards/punishments, and any resulting downstream effects of the same.

Fourth, viewing external regulation as a composite that always includes amotivation as a component, might be the (or one) experiential basis of a, “but for…” cognitive appraisal on the part of the person targeted by contingencies. But for the promise of the reward or the threat of punishment, there would be no behavior oriented toward the (externally) desired outcome—voilà, a functional significance of control.4

References

Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations: Classic definitions and new directions. Contemporary educational psychology, 25(1), 54-67.

Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2017). Self-determination theory: Basic psychological needs in motivation, development, and wellness. Guilford Publications.

Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2020). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation from a self-determination theory perspective: Definitions, theory, practices, and future directions. Contemporary educational psychology, 61, 101860.

Turban, D. B., Tan, H. H., Brown, K. G., & Sheldon, K. M. (2007). Antecedents and outcomes of perceived locus of causality: An application of self‐determination theory. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 37(10), 2376-2404.

Notes:

  1. I was one of those students who disliked chocolate and was accordingly at times unmoved to increase my participation, though my baseline rate was already high. We might suspect, however, that a teacher’s offering of a bribe might contribute to other forms of motivation even for this subset of students.
  2. There seems to be recognition, however, for at least a relatively narrow set of behaviors where motivation may not be mixed—prototypically with intrinsic motivation.
  3. Another example (especially pernicious, in my view) might be behaviorist/psychologically controlling classroom management practices such as those mentioned in Teach Like a Champion imposed on teachers at various (often charter) schools.
  4. There’s another implied ‘but for’ worth mentioning—but for the target’s belief (or lack of disbelief) in the competence of the imposer’s ability to follow through with a reward, and their commitment/inclination to doing so. This is already captured by the first definition of external regulation above.

Autonomo(Us)

Autonomo(us), currently a work in progress, will be a podcast where I interview Self-Determination Theory scholars about recent research. The intention is to create a resource of, by, and for experts in motivation, wellness, and basic psychological needs through the lens of Self-Determination Theory. There is no current timeline for release.

About Me

One December 2013 day as a Peace Corps Volunteer teaching English in Cameroon I was called into the Principal’s office for a staff meeting. Teachers ringed the perimeter of the space. Students, lined up outside, were called in one by one to answer for disciplinary infractions. The punishment: to lie on their stomach on the dusty floor—already an indignity—and be struck across the butt with a thick wire. As I watched, I reflected my own practices of dusting my students with chalk dust to manage their misbehavior. The difference was of degree, not of kind.

Since then, I have been someone in search of alternatives to fear and shame, control and pressure. My first evolution came in the form of my work as a wilderness therapy field instructor. I lived alongside humans struggling in essentially human ways, learned to listen empathetically and hold boundaries gently yet firmly, embodying an intent to inform rather than to coerce. After two years—and two harsh winters—backpacking across the Oregon wilderness, I left for a Master’s of Arts in Teaching program at Bard College. When, about halfway through, I acquired a copy of Richard M. Ryan and Edward L Deci’s Self-Determination Theory: Basic Psychological Needs in Motivation, Development, and Wellness, my trajectory had an unexpected shift. Looking back to my experience in that dusty Principal’s office, I saw troubling parallels to our educational systems here in the United States.

Now I wonder: How do we support others in understanding and acting upon their values? How do our material circumstances infuse our communication with understanding—or pressure? How can educational environments be designed to invite and sustain deep interest and engagement? How do we respond to motivation?

These questions of needs are the center of my personal and professional goals—and have brought me to Oklahoma, where I hope to study subjects like the validation of doubt as an educational intervention, the affordances of digital technologies for the support of basic psychological needs, and the motivational implications of course artifacts and structures.